Choose your battles; often you are in a better position
If “power”, as conventionally understood, conduces to victory in war, then how is the victory of the “weak” over the “strong” explained? Key explanations include:
Strategic interaction;
Willingness of the weak to suffer more or bear higher costs;
External support of weak actors;
Internal group dynamics/fighting and
Inflated strong actor war aims.
Evolution of asymmetric rivals’ attitudes towards time: patience and surprise
Since 1950, however, weak actors have won a majority of all asymmetric conflicts
Tactical basis
The tactical success of asymmetric warfare is dependent on at least some of the following assumptions:
One side can have a technological advantage which outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy
Destruction of multiple electric lines, roads or water supply systems in highly populated areas could have devastating effects on economy and morale, while the weaker side may not have these structures at all.
Training and tactics as well as technology can prove decisive and allow a smaller force to overcome a much larger one. For example, for several centuries the Greek hoplite’s (heavy infantry) use of phalanx made them far stronger to their enemies. The Battle of Thermopylae, which also involved good use of terrain, is a well-known example.
If the weaker power is in a position of self-defense; i.e., under attack or occupation, it may be possible to use unconventional tactics, such as hit-and-run and selective battles in which the stronger power is weaker, as an effective means of harassment without violating the laws of war. Perhaps the classical historical examples of this doctrine may be found in the American Revolutionary War, movements in World War II, such as the French Resistance and Soviet and Yugoslav partisans. Against democratic aggressor nations, this strategy can be used to play on the electorate’s patience with the conflict (as in the Vietnam War, and others since) provoking protests, and consequent disputes among elected legislators.
If the weaker power is in an aggressive position, however, and/or turns to tactics prohibited by the laws of war (jus in bello), its success depends on the stronger power’s refraining from like tactics. For example, the law of land warfare prohibits the use of a flag of truce or clearly marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or ambush, but an asymmetric combatant using this prohibited tactic to its advantage depends on the stronger power’s obedience to the corresponding law. Similarly, laws of warfare prohibit combatants from using civilian settlements, populations or facilities as military bases, but when an weaker power uses this tactic, it depends on the premise that the larger power will respect the law that the other is violating, and will not attack that civilian target, or if they do the propaganda advantage will outweigh the material loss. As seen in most conflicts of the 20th and 21st centuries, this is highly unlikely as the propaganda advantage has always outweighed adherence to international law, especially by dominating sides of any conflict.
Looking at the victory as a part of a larger situation, the situation could either be no-win, or more of a win for the other side than the one that won the “victory”, or victory at such cost that the gains are outweighed by the cost and are no longer a source of joy.
For example, the “victorious” side may have accomplished their objective, but the objective may have been worthless, or they may lose a strategic advantage in manpower or positioning. (One example is Great Britain in WWII, where Britain was one of the victorious powers, but found itself so exhausted in the process as to no longer be able to maintain its great power status in a world now dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.) A related concept is sometimes described as winning the battle but losing the war, where a lesser (sub-) objective is won but the true objective beyond it is not well pursued and is lost.
ibaadu 